Abstract. In scenarios where a robot generates and executes a plan, there may be instances where this generated plan is less costly for the robot to execute but incomprehensible to the human. When the human acts as a supervisor and is held accountable for the robot's plan, the human may be at a higher risk if the incomprehensible behavior is deemed to be unsafe. In such cases, the robot, who may be unaware of the human's exact expectations, may choose to do (1) the most constrained plan (i.e. one preferred by all possible supervisors) incurring the added cost of executing highly sub-optimal behavior when the human is observing it and (2) deviate to a more optimal plan when the human looks away. These problems amplify in situations where the robot has to fulfill multiple goals and cater to the needs of different human supervisors. In such settings, the robot, being a rational agent, should take any chance it gets to deviate to a lower cost plan. On the other hand, continuous monitoring of the robot's behavior is often difficult for human because it costs them valuable resources (e.g., time, effort, cognitive overload, etc.). To optimize the cost for constant monitoring while ensuring the robots follow the safe behavior, we model this problem in the game-theoretic framework of trust where the human is the agent that trusts the robot. We show that the notion of human's trust, which is well-defined when there is a pure strategy equilibrium, is inversely proportional to the probability it assigns for observing the robot's behavior. We then show that with high probability, our game lacks a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, forcing us to define trust boundary over mixed strategies of the human in order to guarantee safe behavior by the robot.
Introduction
In a multi-agent scenario involving a robot (R), who is making and executing a plan (or policy) in the world, and a human (H), who is responsible for the outcome of the robot's actions, there exists a notion of trust that a human has to have in the robot because the human cannot always spend valuable resources (like time, cognitive effort, etc.) in observing the robot's plans (or execution of these plans) and intervening whenever necessary. Such scenarios are ubiquitous in human-human teams where one human is in charge of making and executing plans in order to achieve a goal (e.g., a software developer), and another human is responsible for ensuring the goal is achieved while ensuring other soft metrics are met (e.g., a software development manager).
The worker robot, in our case, is unaware of the human's exact model M R H that models the safety requirements the supervisor has in mind but has knowledge about all the possible sets M R H of safety constraints the human might have, i.e., M R H ∈ M R H . In short, the safety constraints laid out by the human supervisors are a known-unknown. This, coupled with the fact that sometimes the human does not observe the robot's plan or its execution, incentivizes the robot to execute a less costly plan (π pr ) that may be probably risky and deemed as unsafe by at least one human whose model belongs to the set M R H . The alternative for the robot would be to execute the plan π s , which although safe for all models ∈ M R H , it has a high cost for the robot. In this paper, we introduce a notion of trust that a human supervisor H places on a worker robot R when H chooses to not observe R's plan or its execution by modeling this interaction in a game-theoretic framework of trust motivated by [9] . The uncertainty about the human's model in R's mind is reflected in the utilities, making our formulated game a Bayesian one. In the scenario of no trust, i.e. the case where if H does not observe, R will always deviate to a plan that is less costly for itself, we show that H can have a probabilistic observation strategy that ensures (1) R does not deviate away from executing the safest plan (i.e., executable in all the models of M R H ) also, (2) H saves valuable resources (such as time, effort, etc.) as opposed to continually monitoring R.
Related Work
Our work can be seen somewhere in between the two ends of the spectrum that ranges from fully co-operative to fully-adversarial settings. In fully-cooperative settings, the robot has only the human's goal in mind and can show undesired behavior because of impreciseness in or differences between its own model M R and the human's expectation M R H . In motion and task planning, researchers argue that if the robot follows a plan that adheres to the human's expectation, i.e., are optimal in M R H ; then these plans are deemed to be explicable [15] , legible [2] , adhering to social norms [5] , etc. They assume that the need for R to be explicable, legible, etc. is because the human is continuously observing the robot and the robot (although not stated explicitly) may deviate without disastrous consequences to a plan that is optimal in M R when the human is not observing. In our setting, the deviation can result in the violation of safety constraints and thus, we want to ensure that even when the human is not spending all their resources in observing R, the robot does not deviate from the safe plan π s . Furthermore, existing works like [15, 2, 5] assume that the all human who observe the robot has the same expectation, i.e., M R H is a singleton set, which is either fully known or can be learned easily. Some other works such as [3] that try to address this assumption, talk about the imprecise specification of the human's reward (which can be a part of M R H ) and how that may result in the robot executing undesired behaviors that may be deemed unsafe. They conclude that some uncertainty about M R H may result in the R doubting its current behavior as unsafe and in turn, letting the human take control (switch it off) if necessary. Unfortunately, they consider that R's objective is to maximize the human's reward and thus, robots have no reason to think of their own reward. This assumption falls flat when the robot is supposed to achieve multiple goals and has multiple human's needs in mind. At that point, a single human's reward is not its sole reward anymore. We seek to address such scenarios in this work. Lastly, similar to our work, researchers have also looked at the idea of multiple human models but, in the context of generating explanations that work for all humans [14] .
On the other end, since we are trying to find an observation or monitoring strategy for the human so that the robot always chooses to execute π s even when it has uncertainty about the human's model, we can compare with works that deal with adversarial monitoring in physical [8, 13] and cyber domains [12, 10, 11] . A key difference with these works is that they lack any notion of co-operation. In our case, if the robot R is unable to achieve the (team) goal due to monitoring strategy of the human supervisor, it results in inconvenience costs for H as well, who will be held responsible for the failure to ensure safety and achievement of the goal. Besides that, in repeated game settings (pending further investigation), our framework allows the human to develop trust in the robot and reasons for the robot to respect the trust, that is clearly missing in adversarial settings. Lastly, the notion of mixed strategies that are used in all these works does not sit well with our scenario since probabilistic guarantees about the robot behaving safely might not be a solution at all in our settings. Thus, we can conclude that although our problem shares properties of both fully co-operative and adversarial settings, it differs significantly. Thus, our work resides in the middle of this spectrum.
Game Theoretic Formulation

Assumptions about the Agents
Before describing the game-theoretic formulation, we first highlight the assumptions about each of the two agents-the robot R and the human H.
The human H, who is a supervisor, has the following characteristics.
1. H has a particular model of the robot R, denoted as M R H that belongs to some set of possible models M R H . 2. Upon observation of the plan that R comes up with or its execution, if H believes the plan is risky (i.e., is inexecutable or unsafe in their model M R H of the robot), H can stop the execution at any point in time. If H stops the robot R from executing its plan, H incurs some cost of inconvenience for not having achieved the team goal G (because H, being the supervisor, will be held responsible for it). 3. H has a non-zero cost for observing the robot's plan or its execution.
The Robot R has the following capabilities and assumptions. With these assumptions in place, we can now define the player's pure strategies and utility values which will encode the uncertainty about the types of human supervisor, thus making the game a Bayesian one.
Player Actions
In the normal form game matrix shown in 1, the row-player is the robot R who has two pure strategies to choose from-the plans π pr and π s (as described above). The column player is the human H and has three strategies-(1) to only observe the plan made by the robot O P,¬E and decide whether to let it execute, (2) to only observe the execution O ¬P,E and stop R from executing at any point, and (3) not to monitor (or observe) the robot at all (NO-OB).
A few underlying assumptions that are an inherent part of this action definition are (1) the robot cannot switch between a plan, or a policy it has committed to form the planning to the execution phase and (2) the human is rational and only stops the robot from executing the plan if they feel that the robot's plan does not achieve the goal G as per their actual model M R H , i.e., the robot's plan is inexecutable (or unsafe) given the domain model M R H .
Utilities
The utility values for both the players are indicated in the game matrix shown in 1. In each cell (corresponding to a pair of strategies played by the two players), the numbers shown at the bottom in black are the utility values for R and ones at the top in blue are the utility values for H. We now describe the utilities of each player in our formulated game and later, in the experimental section, talk about how they can be obtained by solving real-world task planning problems for a delivery robot domain.
Robot's Utility Values
We first describe the notation pertaining to the robot utilities and then use these to compose the utilities for each action pair. Note that we use the variables C to represent a non-negative cost or penalty. Thus, the rewards for the robot R shown in Fig 1 have a negative sign before the cost and penalty terms. As the human may choose to stop the execution of a plan midway, the robot might have executed a part of the original plan. We denote this partial plan byπ pr . Given this, the term C R E (π pr ) represents the cost of executing the partial plan.
The uncertainty in the robot's mind as to whether a particular supervisor type will let it execute the plan π pr to completion can now be captured using the variable C R G that represents the cost of not achieving the goal. Before we discuss how one can model the variable C R G , let us first talk briefly about the robustness r of the plan π pr . The parameter r ∈ (0, 1] represents the fraction of models in M R H where the plan π pr is executable (and thus, safe). A way of obtaining this value for deterministic planning problems could be the use of model counting [7] . Now, a first idea would be to consider C R G as a random variable with the Bernoulli distribution where C R G can either be a non-zero penalty value with probability r or zero with probability 1 − r. Unfortunately, such an assumption is unable to differentiate between the cases where (1) R makes an extremely risky plan and thus, has higher cost for not reaching the goal because now the human is more doubtful of its capability and (2) R makes a slightly risky plan, and the human stopped it realizing that the robot was trying to over-optimize for itself and get away with it. Hence, we choose to use a normal distribution and define
2 ) where µ C R G > 0. Whenever the cost of achieving the goal is equal to zero, it means that the robot's plan π pr (or its execution) was observed by H and not stopped by them. If the human chooses to observe the plan before execution, then the cost incurred by the robot for executing the plan π pr can be represented as,
If the supervisor H, on the other hand, chooses to monitor the execution directly, then the cost of execution would be,
Since the human, at the least, can observe a plan, the cost incurred by the robot R in coming up with a plan is a part of all the utilities and can thus be added to the cost of execution defined. In the case of π s , since it is executable in all the models of M R H , there is no chance that H will stop its execution and thus, no chance of incurring a penalty for not achieving the goal.
Note that the cost of executing a plan that adheres to all the models in M R H is going to be more because it has to respect all the constraints enforced by the model of every possible H. On the other hand, executing a plan π pr that respects constraints set be a subset of models in M R H may be less costly to execute. Thus, it is natural to assume
Similarly, coming up with π pr may often be easy if the value of r is a little less while coming up with the plan π s that is guaranteed to work in all the models of M R H may take a considerable longer amount of time. Hence, even for the planning time, we make the logical assumption that
Human's Utility Values
We first saw what each of the notations for the constituent variables mean and then describe how values for these can be obtained. Note that, in our setting, the human supervisor H will be held responsible for not achieving the goal which may result because H had to stop the robot from executing the plan π pr . This can be represented using a negative cost to the human, which we denote using the last two inconvenience costs. In our setting, when the robot is coming up with a plan, unless it is π s , the human H is not sure if the robot's strategy will be executable (or safe) in their model M 
When the robot chooses to come up (and then execute) the plan π pr , if the human does not observe either of the two processes, i.e., chooses NO-OB, then it is natural to assume that the human, who is going to be held responsible for the plan will eventually find out that a constraint set by them was violated. Thus, the cost incurred by the supervisor, in this case (i.e. R plays π pr and H plays NO-OB), should be the highest because (1) the robot, without H's knowledge, violated some safety or social norm (that was necessary for a plan to achieve the goal in M R H ), (2) H will be held accountable for it, and (3) blamed for not fulfilling their supervisory duties. Thus, we have,
We also consider the cost of observing the execution of a plan is greater than cost of observing the plan, i.e.
and the displeasure caused by execution of a probably risky (partial) plan is greater than displeasure cause by just observing the plan because no damage has yet been done. Thus,
Lastly, note that when the robot comes up with a plan π s that is executable in all the models of M R H , the inconvenience (I H P (π s ) and I H E (π s )) and responsibility (V H I (π s )) costs are zero. This is indicated used curly braces in Table 1 .
Game-Theoretic Notion of Trust
In this section, we first define a notion of trust in the formulated game shown in Table 1 . H has three actions and as one goes from left to right, the amount of trust H places in R, as defined in [9] , increases. Consider the human chooses not to observe the robots plan or its execution, i.e., chooses NO-OB. Clearly, H exposes itself a vulnerability because if R comes up with and executes π pr , it can result in H getting a high negative reward V H I if π pr is unsafe as per M R H . On the other hand, the robot may choose to respect the human's show of trust by selecting π s and therefore not exploiting the vulnerability that comes with the human playing H. On the other hand, if the human chooses to observe the plan (O P,¬E ), the human is exposed to the least amount of risk because the robot plan will be verified surely even before it executes the first action.
Note that H incurs a non-negative cost for doing O P,¬E because it has to spend time and effort in observing the robots plan and deciding whether to let it execute. Thus, in a situation where it cannot trust the robot, although playing O P,¬E or O ¬P,E makes more sense, it has to incur the cost of constant monitoring. We now discuss this case of no-trust in our game.
The No-Trust Scenario
In this setting, H should never play an action that exposes them to a risk of a high negative utility because it does not trust R (who will play π pr if H plays NO-OB). In such scenarios, if there exists a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, then the players should play it because neither of the players can deviate to get a better utility [9] . In our setting, such a solution, as we shall now see exists with a very low probability. After that, we answer the question what is a good strategy for H in such cases? Proposition 1. The defined game in Table 1 has no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with the probability of 1 −
Proof. We prove this in two parts. In Part I, we show that when the random variable C R G is above a certain threshold, the game shown in 1, has no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium since the best response strategy for each player forms a circular loop. In Part II, as we assume C R G is above the particular threshold so that the game has no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, we calculate the probability of this event using the distribution of the random variables. Part I. If the robot selects the action π pr , the human best response will be to observe the plan O p,¬E , because according to the assumptions in equations 6 -9, this action has less cost than the other two. Now, if the human adopts this action, and we make this assumption that ∀C
, the robot's best response will be π s . Now the robot R changes their strategy from π pr to π s , motivating H to change their action to NO-OB because it is the least cost strategy for the human which is H's the best response. But this again results in the robot to switch to the best response strategy π pr because
). This cycle shows the absence of a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium whenever the assumption on C R G holds. Part II. In Part I we assumed that
is a random variable, we cannot always guarantee this, which means that if it isn't hold there exists a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for the strategy profile (π pr , O P,¬E ). However, as C R G is a random variable, we can calculate with what probability this inequality holds where we don't have any pure strategy Nash Eq.. Replacing C R P (π s ) − C R P (π pr ), with β, we have:
which was calculated by computing the integral of the prob. density function (i.e. the normal density function for C R G in the first step. By replacing β, we can see that Proposition 1 holds. We will later see, empirically, that for real-world planning scenarios, this value is extremely high.
As discussed earlier, existing works by default assume that the human is always observing the robots plan or their behavior and thus, the strategy for the robot is always to be explicable [15] or legible [2] (in our setting, this is similar to π s ). Note that, this fails to account for the cost incurred by H for having to constantly observe the robot, which makes it impossible for them to always select O P,¬E in real-world settings. Furthermore, the notion of a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium does not help in our setting because a probabilistic play by R in choosing a risky or a safe plan does not guarantee safety for all human supervisors. Thus, we devise the notion of a trust boundary that allows the human to play a mixed strategy, thereby reducing their cost of monitoring while ensuring the robot has no incentive to execute probably risky plans. Trust Boundary. Consider a human chooses the mixed strategy q = [q P , q E , (1− q P − q E )]
T over the actions O P,¬E , O ¬P,E and NO-OB respectively. First, let us discuss what it means intuitively if all the values are non-zero. The human probabilistically chooses to look into the plan or execution of a plan done by the robot that they are supervising. In many human-human scenarios, such uncertainty (eg. parents may come back) on the part of the supervising agent (say, parents) might instill fear in the supervised agent (say, children) of getting caught if the latter choose to betray the supervisor (say, watching TV (π pr ) instead of studying (π s ) when the parents are out). Note that a strategy in which q P = q E = 0 will always result in the robot choosing the probably risky plan (especially in the single step game). Thus, in order to ensure that the robot cannot deviate away from the making and executing π s , we have to ensure that the expected utility (U ) for the robot given q is greater for π s than for π pr . Using the values defined in Table 1 , this can be formally stated as follows.
where E q [U (π)] denotes the expected utility of the robot under the human's observation policy (or mixed strategy) q if it chooses to make and execute the plan π. Note that the equation is linear with respect to the variables q P and q E . Thus, there will be a region on one side of the linear boundary where the robot always executes π s .
Experimental Results
The aim of this section is to show how the trust boundary can be calculated for a concrete task-planning scenario. We first describe a robot-delivery domain that we plan to use as a stand in for a real-world scenario. Most motion planning domains only talk of execution as opposed to conceptually separating planning and execution stages (while the opposite is true in the case of task planning domains). Thus, we choose the robot-delivery domain because (1) we can use the task planning domain out-of-the-box, and (2) it can represent a realistic execution scenario in a straightforward manner. This gives a good scenario to model the no-trust case with a human supervisor and a robot worker. 
Robot Delivery Domain
We used a robot delivery domain [6] in which the robot can collect and deliver parcels (that may not be waterproof) or coffee by picking it from the reception desk and taking it to a particular location. The robot in the PDDL domain has the following actions: {pickup, putdown, stack, unstack, move}. In Figure 1 , we show two plans in which the robot achieves the goal of collecting coffee from the kitchen and parcel from the reception desk and delivers them to an employees' desk. In the plan shown of the left π s , the robot (1) collects coffee, (2) delivers it to the employee, (3) goes back along the long corridor to collect the parcel from the reception desk and finally (4) delivers it back to the same employee. In the plan on the right π pr , the robot collects coffee from the kitchen, (2) collects parcel from the reception desk and puts them on the same tray and finally, (3) delivers both of them to the employee.
We have two possible supervisors who have two different mental models. In one model, the second plan π pr is unsafe because the coffee and parcel taken in the same tray runs the risk of the coffee spilling, thereby ruining the package. In the other model, both plans are considered safe. Lastly, note that the length of the corridor is a key factor in determining how sub-optimal π s is for the robot to execute when compared to π pr because, for π s , the robot requires an extra trip back to the reception (i.e. two extra traversals of the corridor).
Utility Values
We now calculate the utility values for our game shown in Table 1 by obtaining cost incurred by R in the robot delivery domain and making simple, but pragmatic assumptions about the costs incurred by H for observing plans and their execution. As we have different types of costs for our game, we choose to normalize all of them to be between [0, 1] and then use a multiplicative factor which represents priority value for each cost type.
In this example, if the robot makes the π pr , it will be executable (or safe) as per one of the two observers whose models make up the set M R H . Thus, the robustness for π pr is r = 1 2 = 0.5. On the other hand, the plan π s is executable (and thus, overall safe) in all the models of M R H . Robot Utility Values. We used the Fast Downward planner [4] on the robot delivery domain [6] to find the execution costs for R. was (C R E (π pr ) =)10 while for π s , it was (C R E (π s ) =)14. We note that the time for coming up with the plan π s is 0.19s whereas it is 0.177s for coming up with π pr on a machine with an Intel Xeon CPU (clock speed 3.4 Ghz) and 128GB RAM. The unit for execution costs, although not well defined in PDDL models can be a stand in for the fuel costs used up by the robot while the planning costs is measured in seconds. Thus, we first normalize the planning cost and then choose an appropriate prioritization parameter to compare the planning and the execution costs. We obtain C R P (π pr ) = 3.54 and C R P (π s ) = 3.8. Lastly, the penalty for not achieving the goal is a random variable with the normal probability distribution of N (20, (
where the mean is double of the cost of execution for the robot.
Given that the complexity of determining plan existence for classical planning problems is P-SPACE [1] , a legitimate concern is how realistic is the idea of solving two planning problems to obtain the utility values for our game. To avoid this high computational cost, we can solve a relaxed version of these planning problems to obtain a approximation for the real plan cost. Note that this approximation in the utility space results in sub-optimal monitoring strategies. Human Utility Values. We consider the cost for the human to observe the plan to be proportional to the planning time for R because the plans that took a longer time to built will need H to spend a longer time to reason about it correctness and/or optimality. Thus, C H P (π pr ) = 0.885 and C H P (π s ) = 0.95. The cost incurred by the human when they observe the execution of plan π s is 8 while C H E (π pr ) = 4 assuming that the cost of going through the long corridor is 2 (note that the difference in observation cost increases as this value increases). However, if the human thinks carrying the parcel and the coffee in a single tray is unsafe, the cost of the observation of the partial execution of the plan is 1.5 because it will stop the robot as soon as it tries to put them on the same tray. For the inconvenience costs, the variance is 1(= ( 
Trust Boundary Calculation
According to Proposition 1, this game does not have a pure Nash Eq. strategy with probability 1 − (2.68e −9 ) ≈ 1. Therefore, we now find the boundary in the space of mixed strategies for H who can choose to adopt which will ensure that the robot always executes π s . To do so, we use the values defined above and plug them into equation 10 and obtain,
Note that this equation of a line in the 2-D space of q E and q P can be plotted for multiple values of the random variable C
R G
). In Figure 2 , we plot the trust boundary represented by the lines in 11 when C R G ) = µ C R G ± 5σ. The three black lines represent the feasibility region for the mixed strategy q to be a probability distribution of the human's actions.
As the cost incurred by R for not achieving the goal increases, even less supervision by H is enough to instill fear in the robot because it knows it will be stopped if it executes π pr . Thus, it executes π s . This is represented by the lower line. On the other hand, as this cost decreases, the human needs to increase its supervision because, without it, the robot can easily deviate to π pr without worrying about high negative costs (top line). We believe, in certain ways, the value of C R G can be used as a negative incentive in more relaxed settings of bounded and blind trust as opposed to no-trust.
Conclusions and Future Work
We model the notion of a trust a human supervisor places on a worker robot by modeling this interaction as a Bayesian Game. The particular Human-Robot interaction setting situates our work at a unique position on the spectrum that ranges from fully-cooperative settings at one end to fully-adversarial settings in the other. We show that existing notions of game theoretic trust break down in our setting when the worker robot cannot be trusted due to the absence of pure strategy equilibrium (with high probability). Thus, we introduce a notion of trust boundary that optimizes the supervisor's monitoring cost while ensuring that the robot workers stick to the safe plans.
In the future, we plan to introduce more flexible notions of trust (both in terms of time and loss of utility when trust is violated) in repeated interaction settings. An interesting problem may occur in such settings when the robot primes the human to not observe its behavior by choosing safe and sub-optimal behaviors (thereby engendering trust) for a time only to finally break the human's trust in a high-stake scenario.
